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Is it ever acceptable for a judge in a secular 
liberal democracy1 to rely on, and explicitly 
refer to, religious-based reasoning2 in reach-
ing a decision? While it is unlikely that many 
Canadian judges will be seized with the de-
sire to include religious-based reasoning in 
their judgments, we raise this issue because 
it allows us to examine the appropriate role 
of religious-based discourse in a challenging 
context, where arguments about unconstitu-
tionality are strongest. In a previous article, 
we concluded that there are no ethical imped-
iments to citizens using such discourse in dis-
cussing public a#airs. We argued that it is no 
less virtuous (although it may sometimes be 
less persuasive) to reason from one’s religious 
convictions than from any other compre-
hensive set of values, when advocating for or 
against public policy alternatives.3 We would 
suggest that this is generally also the case for 
elected representatives. $us, in our view, it 
would be perfectly acceptable for a member 
of a legislature to buttress a call for increased 
funding for social services by reference to 
Proverbs 19:17: “One who is gracious to a poor 
man lends to the Lord.” 4 However, it is uncon-
stitutional for a legislature to pass legislation 
for a religious purpose5; therefore, legislators 
must recognize the distinction between advo-
cating legislation designed to achieve a reli-
gious purpose and using religious arguments 
to support or oppose legislation designed to 
achieve a public purpose.6
$e question we address here is whether it 
would be acceptable for a Canadian judge to 
use religious-based reasoning and, if so, what 
parameters might need to be placed on the use 
of such reasoning. We conclude that the use of 
religious-based reasoning would be acceptable, 
but only where the law is underdetermined; that 
is, where the relevant constitutional principles, 
legislation and case law do not resolve the issue, 
and where substantial interpretation and devel-
opment of the law is required in order to decide 
the matter before the judge. We would add the 
further important proviso that the reasoning 
must conform to the constitutional require-
ment that the state remain neutral as among 
di#erent religions and as between religion and 
non-religion. 
We begin our discussion by outlining what 
we mean by legal underdeterminacy, and then 
respond to various arguments against allowing 
religious-based reasoning by judges, with a par-
ticular focus on arguments relating to unfair-
ness and unconstitutionality.
When is the law underdetermined?
We start from the premise that where the law is 
clear, there is no room (or reason) for a judge to 
turn to his comprehensive set of beliefs—reli-
gious or not—to reach a conclusion. For exam-
ple, consider a situation where a statute states 
that it is an o#ence to drive faster than 110 km/
hour. If the evidence makes it clear that the ac-
cused did so, and there are no valid defences put 
forward, the judge must %nd the accused guilty; 
the law is settled and reaching the appropriate 
verdict requires no reference to extra-judicial 
fundamental beliefs. Consider another example. 
A First Nation in Canada makes a land claim 
based on Aboriginal title. $e Supreme Court of 
Canada has set out a test, based on historic use 
and occupation of the land, for determining the 
existence of Aboriginal title. While it may be 
di&cult to decide whether the test has been met 
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stated in the law. $erefore, it is the test that any 
lower court must work with, and a judge can-
not turn to her religion—or to any other com-
prehensive set of values—to cra( a new test for 
determining the existence of Aboriginal title. 
Nor may judges use their religious—or other—
beliefs to undermine the legal system they are 
part of. For instance, a judge could not refuse to 
follow the rule of law because it did not conform 
with her religious beliefs. If the fundamental 
principles of the legal system are incompatible 
with a judge’s core beliefs, then she should step 
down.
Even within an established system of law, 
however, there will be times when the law is 
underdetermined. As an example, consider a 
1999 decision of the Supreme Court of Cana-
da, Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v Dobson,7 
where the Court was called on to develop new 
legal principles in order to resolve a di&cult and 
signi%cant issue. In Dobson, the Supreme Court 
of Canada addressed the question of whether 
a child could sue his mother for harms caused 
by the mother’s negligence during pregnancy. 
Although previous case law dealt with related 
issues, there was no Canadian jurisprudence di-
rectly on point. 
Mrs. Dobson, %ve months pregnant, was 
driving her car on a snowy winter day. Her car 
skidded; there was an accident and her son, 
Ryan, was born prematurely. Ryan has cerebral 
palsy; he is profoundly disabled and requires 
lifetime care. Ryan sued his mother, alleging 
negligence. If Mrs. Dobson had been found 
negligent, then her insurers would have had 
to make a substantial payment to Ryan. First, 
however, the Supreme Court of Canada had to 
decide whether Mrs. Dobson was liable in law. 
Could Ryan sue his mother on the grounds that 
her negligence during pregnancy caused him 
harm?
$e Supreme Court of Canada was in un-
charted legal waters. $is was the %rst time that 
the Court had been called upon to answer this 
question and neither the Constitution, relevant 
legislation, nor case law provided a clear-cut 
answer. $e Court had to decide which of the 
competing public policy alternatives should 
prevail, and choosing among those alternatives 
required making value judgments about how 
the law could best serve the interests of society, 
as well as its individual members such as Ryan 
and his mother. 
$e majority of the Court refused to extend 
established principles of tort law in order to al-
low Ryan to sue his mother. $eir decision was 
based on public policy concerns regarding the 
privacy and autonomy rights of women, and on 
the di&culties inherent in articulating a judi-
cial standard of conduct for pregnant women. 
$e two dissenting judges held that concerns 
about autonomy could not justify placing the 
rights of a pregnant woman above that of her 
child. $ey went on to say: “To grant a pregnant 
woman immunity from the reasonably foresee-
able consequences of her acts for her born alive 
child would create a legal distortion as no other 
plainti# carries such a one-sided burden, nor 
any defendant such an advantage.”8
In Dobson, neither the majority nor the dis-
senting judgment referred to religious beliefs 
or values at all—but what if they had? What if 
the judge writing for the majority had related 
the public policy argument about autonomy 
to a religious belief that God has created all of 
us, male and female, as equal and autonomous 
beings, equally deserving of respect and dig-
nity? What if the dissenting judges had based 
their decision on a belief in God’s concern for 
the vulnerable and the powerless? $e outcome 
of the case would have been the same, but the 
analysis would have been explicitly grounded in 
religious belief and reasoning. Would express 
reliance on religious-based reasoning be ac-
ceptable in a case such as this? 
!e arguments against religious-
based judicial reasoning
$e key arguments against the explicit use of re-
ligious-based reasoning by judges involve con-
cerns about inherent dangers in religious-based 
reasoning; inconsistency with the role of the 
judge in a democracy; unfairness to litigants; 
and threats to freedom of religion. We address 
each of these, with a particular emphasis on 
fairness and freedom of religion.
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Inherent dangers in religious-based reasoning
$e argument that religious-based reasoning 
is inherently more dangerous than other kinds 
of value-based reasoning seems to encompass 
three strands: that religious belief requires a 
leap of faith and thus any reasoning based on 
religion is inherently more risky than reason-
ing based on a secular, rational approach; that 
religious-based reasoning is inherently more 
divisive than other kinds of argumentation; 
and that religious-based reasoning is inherently 
more likely to lead to bad results.9
With regard to the %rst strand, we acknowl-
edge that religious belief involves a leap of faith. 
By “leap of faith” we mean accepting as true 
something that is not empirically provable. 
Rejecting religious-based reasoning on this 
ground raises the larger epistemological ques-
tion of whether there are justi%able grounds for 
saying that certain ways of knowing are supe-
rior to others.10 $ere is also the more pragmatic 
point that the leap of faith argument simply does 
not work as a means to distinguish religious 
reasoning from secular reasoning. We take it as 
given that most people’s conclusions about what 
is right or wrong, what is just, or what course of 
action is the better one, are grounded in some 
sort of comprehensive set of values—that is, by 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of 
reality, whether religious or secular.11 We ar-
gue that leaps of faith are required for any such 
fundamental assumptions and, therefore, this is 
no di#erent for religion than for other compre-
hensive belief systems. For instance, it is a core 
premise of liberalism that all people are entitled 
to equal rights—presumably because at some 
fundamental level, all human beings have equal 
intrinsic value, unrelated to their social status, 
wealth, character, accomplishments, contribu-
tions to society or physical or mental attain-
ments. $ere is no way of empirically prov-
ing this inherent equal value: a leap of faith is 
required.
Further, while we accept that religious belief 
is grounded on a leap of faith, when we speak 
of judges using religious-based reasoning, our 
emphasis is as much on “reasoning” as on “reli-
gious.” Whatever fundamental principles form 
the bedrock of a judge’s worldview, judges must 
reason and analyze—and this is never more so 
than when the law is underdetermined and it 
is necessary to turn to extra-judicial values in 
order to choose between di#erent approaches 
to the issue in dispute. Even if it is acceptable 
for judges to make explicit reference to religion 
when faced with a situation of underdetermi-
nacy, there is still the expectation that reason-
ing is involved. $us, we distinguish between a 
judge moving directly from her understanding 
of divine will to the outcome (as in “God told 
me to decide for the plainti#”)12 and a judge, 
faced with underdeterminacy, using principles 
derived from his religious beliefs as a starting 
place for the analysis.13 A well-known exam-
ple of the latter kind of reasoning is found in 
the landmark case of Donoghue v Stevenson,14 
where the House of Lords was called on to set 
the parameters of liability in the newly-emerging 
%eld of negligence. $e existing law did not pro-
vide a clear answer, so Lord Atkin turned to the 
Golden Rule, stating: 
$e rule that you are to love your neighbour 
becomes in law you must not injure your 
neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who 
is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts 
or omissions which you can reasonably fore-
see would be likely to injure your neighbour. 
Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? $e an-
swer seems to be—persons who are so closely 
and directly a#ected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation 
as being so a#ected when I am directing my 
mind to the acts or omissions which are called 
in question.15
A second danger sometimes attributed to religious-
based reasoning is that it is inherently disruptive. 
$us, Richard Rorty claims, “[W]e shall not be 
able to keep a democratic community going 
unless the religious believers remain willing to 
trade privatization for a guarantee of religious 
liberty.”16 We addressed this argument in our 
previous article,17 and so we need only canvas 
it brie)y here. In short, our response is that re-
ligious beliefs are no more divisive than many 
other strongly held convictions. To understand 
the absurdity of Rorty’s claim we need only 
substitute another comprehensive, but secular, 
world view: “We shall not be able to keep a dem-
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ocratic community going unless libertarians are 
willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of 
freedom of conscience.” 
$e %nal strand of the argument that religious-
based reasoning is inherently dangerous focuses 
less on the reasoning process, or on the reactions 
of others to that reasoning, and more on the 
outcomes that are assumed to follow from such 
reasoning. $is fear seems to proceed from the 
assumption that all individuals of faith hold 
similar views on social issues—an assumption 
that is clearly untenable in light of the great 
diversity of religious beliefs—and that these 
views are harmful to society. We reject the po-
sition that reasoning based on religious beliefs 
is inherently more likely to lead to bad results 
than reasoning based, for instance, on conser-
vatism, libertarianism, feminism, or some other 
secular philosophy. While we acknowledge “the 
demonstrated, ubiquitous human propensity to 
be mistaken and even to deceive oneself about 
what God has revealed,”18 we are convinced that 
humans are equally capable of using secular 
reasons to delude themselves into doing terrible 
things in the name of a greater good. $us, as 
“so much of the twentieth century attests, … 
one need not be a religious believer to adhere to 
one’s fundamental belief with closed-minded or 
even fanatical tenacity.”19
!e role of judges in a democracy
Would express use of religious-based reason-
ing by judges where the law is underdetermined 
erode the role of judges in a democracy? Demo-
cratic values require that a judge be “principled, 
independent and impartial”20 and have a strong 
respect for the rule of law.
In the context of judging, we take “princi-
pled” to mean following and applying accepted 
legal norms, and deciding on the evidence and 
argument before the court, rather than deciding 
on a whim or out of expediency or self-interest. 
$ere is no reason to assume that reasons ground-
ed in religious belief would be any less princi-
pled than reasons grounded in any other set of 
comprehensive values. 
Independence demands that judges not al-
low themselves to be pressured by outside enti-
ties (including government) into deciding a case 
in a particular way; to allow external pressure to 
a#ect a decision would diminish independence. 
Judicial independence would certainly be com-
promised if a judge could be dictated to by a 
religious organization or faith group. However, 
allowing a judge to refer explicitly to religious 
reasoning where the law is underdetermined 
does not automatically compromise judicial 
independence.
Impartiality requires that a judge be neutral 
as between the parties; that is, she cannot be 
predisposed to favour one party over the other. 
Certainly, this value would be undermined if a 
judge, consciously or unconsciously, favoured 
litigants of a particular religion, or favoured 
religious litigants generally over non-religious 
litigants. Again, however, allowing for explicit 
reliance on religious reasoning where the law 
itself does not o#er su&cient guidance does not 
lead inevitably to such favouritism. $ere seems 
no more reason to assume that judges would 
allow themselves to be biased on the basis of 
religion than on the basis of culture, ethnicity, 
gender, or class. $erefore, the dual response to 
concerns about bias should be the same for each 
of these examples: a requirement that judges be 
self-aware and alive to the possibilities of bias, 
however unintended; and a concerted e#ort to 
appoint a diverse judiciary.
$e rule of law is shorthand for a number 
of concepts limiting the arbitrary power of the 
state. $e most famous expression is that of 
Dicey, who described the rule of law as requir-
ing the following:
1. the supremacy of regular law as opposed 
to the in)uence of arbitrary power, ex-
cluding the existence of arbitrariness, 
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary 
authority on the part of the government;
2. equality before the law, excluding the 
idea of any exemption of o&cials or oth-
ers from the duty of obedience to the law 
which governs other citizens;
3. the law of the constitution is not the 
source but the consequences of the rights 
of individuals as de%ned and enforced by 
the courts. 21
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Judicial use of religious-based reasoning where 
the law is underdetermined would not neces-
sarily increase the arbitrary powers of the state, 
reduce the obligation of public o&cials to obey 
the law, or leave individual rights more vulner-
able to state encroachment. 
A more modern description of the rule of 
law is as follows:
$e rule of law presupposes that laws will usu-
ally be obeyed, that breaches of the law will 
usually meet with enforcement, that govern-
ment will be limited in its powers, and that 
courts and the legal profession will be inde-
pendent of government and of powerful pri-
vate interests.22
Generally, none of these principles would be 
diminished if a judge employed religious-based 
reasoning in the context of legal underdeter-
minacy; in particular, such reasoning would 
not make courts more susceptible to pressure 
from government or private interests. One con-
cern might be that individuals opposed to the 
particular religious beliefs relied upon, or to 
all religious beliefs, might then view the law as 
less legitimate and so be less inclined to obey 
it. While not dismissing this argument out of 
hand, we would suggest that the same concern 
could arise whenever citizens are unhappy with 
the value system underlying a particular judicial 
approach; in other words, this is not a concern 
limited to religious-based judicial reasoning.
Unfairness
Leaving aside questions of constitutional-
ity, which are discussed below, is it unfair to 
litigants if a judge makes explicit reference to 
religious-based reasoning, particularly if rely-
ing on a religious tradition not shared by the 
litigant? Some would argue that religious-based 
reasoning is unfair because it is inaccessible 
to those of another religion, or of no religion. 
We canvassed these arguments in our previous 
article;23 brie)y, we suggest that characterizing 
religious reasoning as inaccessible confuses ac-
cessibility with persuasiveness. It is perfectly 
possible to understand a public policy argument 
derived from fundamental beliefs which we do 
not share—we just may not be persuaded by it.
Would express reliance on religious-based 
reasoning where the law is underdetermined 
be unfair because it would require appellants, 
or future litigants in similar cases, to make 
religious-based arguments even if they did not 
wish to? It has been argued that “subsequent 
litigants in analogous hard cases would have to 
challenge both the court’s comprehensive con-
viction about authentic human existence and its 
analysis of legal principles in order to prevail.”24 
Arguably, however, by referring to his religious 
beliefs a judge is simply explaining why he chose 
one approach over another in a context where 
the relevant constitutional principles, legisla-
tion and case law did not provide a clear guide. 
$ose religious beliefs do not, by virtue of hav-
ing been referenced in the decision, now be-
come part of the law. If the losing party wished 
to appeal, she would argue that the lower court 
decision was wrong in law, but would not need 
to rebut the lower court judge’s “comprehensive 
conviction about authentic human existence.” 
$is distinction can be seen if we turn again 
to the issues litigated in the Dobson case. Let 
us assume that a lower court judge had found 
against Ryan Dobson because of concern for 
the autonomy of pregnant women. $ere are 
enough statements in the law regarding au-
tonomy of the person for the judge to conclude 
reasonably that this is a core principle of the 
legal system; however, she would still have to 
decide how to balance the mother’s autonomy 
against the harm done to the child, and at the 
time Dobson was decided, the law had not yet 
struck that balance. In deciding that concerns 
for the mother’s autonomy outweighed other 
arguments, the judge might refer explicitly to 
her belief that God created men and women 
equal. Since individual autonomy is a core value 
of Canada’s legal system, on appeal Ryan Dob-
son would have had to argue that women’s au-
tonomy would not be undermined by allowing 
a child in his situation to sue, or that autono-
my for the pregnant woman is outweighed by 
other equally core values. He would not have to 
persuade the appeal court that the lower court 
judge was wrong in her conviction that God 
created men and women equal.
Perhaps the unfairness stems not from con-
cerns about religious-based reasoning becoming 
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part of the law, but from the fact that the law 
can coerce the individual, and that a coercive 
outcome is illegitimate if it is reached through 
reasoning from values that the individual does 
not share. $us, it has been suggested that “it is 
fundamentally unfair to coerce people, or to use 
the corporate authority and power of the state, 
when the grounds for doing so are not ones that 
those a#ected could be expected to accept if 
they made reasonable judgments.”25
$e idea that state action should be founded 
on grounds that all reasonable people would ac-
cept calls to mind Robert Audi’s stricture that, 
in public debate, virtuous citizens should “seek 
grounds of a kind that any rational adult citi-
zen can endorse as su&cient to the purpose.”26 
$is requirement would suggest that public rea-
son is, at a minimum, reasoning that is likely 
to be seen as persuasive or at least reasonable 
by a broad range of individuals. But is Professor 
Audi’s approach helpful when applied to judges, 
particularly in a situation of legal underdeter-
minacy? $e very fact that the law is under-
determined suggests that the issue before the 
courts is a di&cult and complex one, involving 
competing public policy arguments; certainly 
this was so in the Dobson case. $is complex-
ity in itself lessens the likelihood of %nding one 
perspective that is widely accepted. Further, 
even if wide agreement could be found on an 
important social issue where the law is still un-
settled, this agreement is likely to be at the level 
of general principles that may not give much as-
sistance in real-life decision making. According 
to Greenawalt, certain statements such as “hap-
piness is better than pain” seem so widely ac-
cepted that someone who rejected them “would 
seem not to be of sound mind.”27 $is may be 
so, but, in any real-life clash of interests—which 
is, a(er all, what court cases are about—a judge 
is going to have to consider more pointed ques-
tions: In whom do we create happiness? And 
how? And at what expense to others? What if 
doing right entails pain? What if all the op-
tions available will cause pain or loss to some 
individual or group and the di&cult question 
is how to allocate that pain? Once a judge is re-
quired to answer these more pointed questions, 
it seems inevitable that the reasons for her deci-
sion will be persuasive to some, but completely 
unpersuasive to others.
Dobson is a good example: the reasoning 
of both the majority decision and the dissent, 
although secular, would be hotly contested by 
some Canadians. $ere could be signi%cant 
dispute as to how to weigh and prioritize the 
competing claims of autonomy versus allowing 
those who have been harmed by negligence to 
demand compensation. $us, we would argue 
that e#orts to %nd public reasons—that is, rea-
sons that will be widely “endorse[d] as su&cient 
to the purpose”—are not likely to be successful, 
once one moves beyond broad generalities.28 
If that is so, then it seems that fairness, in the 
context of judging, must mean something other 
than a requirement that judges who are decid-
ing novel issues of law %nd grounds for their de-
cisions that will, in fact, be seen as reasonable by 
everyone, including the losing party.29 
Unconstitutionality
Even if our arguments about fairness are ac-
cepted, it is still necessary to explore whether 
reliance by judges on religious-based reasoning 
when the law is underdetermined would violate 
section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, which states:
Everyone has the following fundamental 
freedoms: 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion.30
In other words, even if we cannot hold judges to 
the standard suggested by Audi for virtuous cit-
izens (by demanding that the basis for their de-
cisions be acceptable to all rational individuals), 
do constitutional di&culties arise if the coer-
cive power of the state is grounded on reasoning 
based on religious faith rather than on a secular 
set of comprehensive values? Is it constitutional 
for a feminist judge to draw upon his feminism 
in deciding a new legal issue (even if the losing 
litigant is profoundly opposed to all feminist 
principles) but unconstitutional, because of the 
protection given in section 2(a) of the Charter, 
for a religious judge to draw upon her faith in 
deciding an equally novel issue?31
Distilling the case law and academic com-
mentary, freedom of religion in Canada in-
cludes both a positive aspect (“freedom for re-
ligion”) and a negative aspect (“freedom from 
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religion”).32 $e positive aspect of freedom of 
religion, that is, the right to worship and live out 
one’s religion as one wishes, so long as this does 
not harm another’s rights, has been described 
by the Supreme Court of Canada as including 
“the right to entertain such religious beliefs as 
a person chooses, the right to declare religious 
beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious be-
lief by worship and practice or by teaching and 
dissemination”33 and the right not to have one’s 
“profoundly personal beliefs”34 interfered with. 
Would the positive aspect of section 2(a) of the 
Charter—freedom for religion—be infringed if 
the judges in the Dobson case reasoned from a 
religious basis in deciding whether a child could 
sue its mother for harm caused by the mother’s 
negligence during pregnancy? Religious-based 
reasoning would not have interfered with the 
litigants’ “profoundly personal beliefs” or un-
dermined their right to manifest those beliefs. 
$e negative aspect of section 2(a), “freedom 
from religion,” protects individuals from direct 
and indirect coercion.35 $is aspect of freedom 
of religion has been interpreted broadly, and 
it requires the state to be neutral among reli-
gions and between religion and non-religion. 
More speci%cally, it is unconstitutional for the 
state to act for a religious purpose, as the Su-
preme Court of Canada made clear by striking 
down legislation intended to enforce a Sunday 
Sabbath.36 
Where the law is underdetermined, if a 
judge places some reliance on her religious 
beliefs in choosing between available options, 
does that create a form of unconstitutional co-
ercion for the losing litigant who does not share 
those religious beliefs? Or, taking this further, 
does it undermine the freedom of religion of 
citizens more generally—those citizens who do 
not share the judge’s religious views, yet will 
be a#ected by the development in the law? We 
see this as potentially the strongest argument 
against religious-based reasoning, and we take 
seriously the need to ensure that judicial rea-
soning does not fall short of the requirement for 
neutrality both among religions and between 
religion and non-religion. 
Returning again to Dobson, a judge could 
place signi%cant weight on the autonomy of 
pregnant women for secular reasons or for re-
ligious reasons. Similarly, a judge could place 
signi%cant weight on protecting the unborn for 
secular reasons or for religious reasons. Which-
ever the outcome, would the judge have acted 
constitutionally where secular reasoning was 
used but unconstitutionally where religious-
based reasoning was used? By using his reli-
gious faith as a starting place from which to 
work through the weighing of competing prin-
ciples in a particular factual context, would the 
judge have failed the requirement to be neutral 
among religions or between religion and non-
religion? It is hard to see how the requirement 
of neutrality would have been breached. $e 
state would not have set one religion above 
another, nor would it have privileged religion 
above atheism or agnosticism. Nor would the 
state be acting for a religious purpose. 
$e issues may become somewhat more nu-
anced, however, if religious belief plays some 
part in the dispute itself or if the case involves 
issues on which at least some religions have spe-
ci%c teachings. Consider the case of Brockie v 
Brillinger,37 which involved both these aspects. 
Mr. Brockie, the owner of a printing company, 
refused to print letterhead and other materials 
for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives, an 
organization committed to enhancing the posi-
tion of gays and lesbians in society by provid-
ing “public access to information, records and 
artifacts, by and about lesbians and gay men in 
Canada.”3 Mr. Brillinger, the president of the 
Archives, brought a complaint under the On-
tario Human Rights Code39 of discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. At the hearing, 
Mr. Brockie stated that he had no objection to 
serving gay or lesbian individuals but that his 
religious beliefs prevented him from printing 
material for an organization that advocated for 
gay and lesbian rights. $e adjudicator upheld 
the complaint and required Mr. Brockie to print 
the material and to pay $5,000 in damages. 
Assume that this decision was appealed to 
the court; the judge hearing the matter would 
be faced with the di&cult matter of balancing 
two con)icting rights-based claims: Mr. Brill-
inger claimed that he was being discriminated 
against on the basis of sexual orientation and 
Volume 19, Number 2, 2011*.
Mr. Brockie claimed that any attempt by the 
state to force him to act against his religious 
principles would violate his freedom of religion. 
$e current law in Canada provides very little 
guidance as to how these kinds of competing 
rights claims should be resolved. What if the 
judge canvassed all relevant constitutional prin-
ciples, legislation and case law, but none proved 
conclusive as to which right should trump the 
other? In deciding which of the rival claims to 
privilege, it is quite likely that a judge would 
have to turn (as presumably the adjudicator did, 
although not explicitly40) to an extra-judicial 
set of values. Would the constitutionality of the 
judge’s reasoning depend on whether those val-
ues were religious in nature? 
One could imagine a judge deciding either 
way, based on secular grounds: “Creating a just 
society requires that close attention be paid to 
the need to uphold the dignity of all individuals, 
particularly those, like gays and lesbians, who 
have historically faced oppression and exclu-
sion”; or “A liberal democratic state requires a 
healthy dose of self-restraint on the part of gov-
ernment and courts; therefore, courts should be 
very wary of forcing individuals to act against 
their core beliefs.” 
It is also possible to imagine a judge decid-
ing either way using religious-based reasoning. 
Here, however, it may be useful to consider di#erent 
religious-based formulations and re-emphasize the 
requirement that legal reasoning of any sort involve 
actual reasoning rather than simply the stating 
of conclusions. In deciding for Mr. Brillinger, 
a judge might start his analysis from the posi-
tion that “All individuals are part of God’s cre-
ation and, therefore, in weighing these claims 
before me, signi%cant weight must be given to 
safeguarding the dignity of each individual.” 
Another judge might state: “God particularly 
loves the dispossessed, so the claims of gays and 
lesbians must always take priority over freedom 
of religion claims.” In deciding for Mr. Brock-
ie, one step in the judge’s reasoning might be 
as follows: “As a believer myself, I understand 
that Mr. Brockie cannot simply set aside his 
religious beliefs while operating in the work-
a-day world. So, while giving serious weight to 
the harm done to Mr. Brillinger if his business 
is refused, I will also give serious consideration 
to the harm caused by forcing an individual to 
act in opposition to their religious convictions.” 
On the other hand, a judge might decide for Mr. 
Brockie on the basis that “$e Bible prohibits 
homosexuality and so claims based on sexual 
orientation must always be subordinated to oth-
er claims.” 
Arguably, the second approach in each pair 
is problematic in that it suggests the automatic 
privileging of one kind of claim over another. 
Such an approach fails to re)ect the fact that 
the law in Canada protects both sexual orienta-
tion and religious freedom, and it comes peril-
ously close to deciding a case based on who the 
parties are rather than on an analysis of the is-
sues at stake. Rather than using one’s religious 
convictions as a lens through which to evaluate 
competing legal principles, a certain religious 
belief is substituted for legal analysis.41 Further, 
at least one of these formulations—“$e Bible 
prohibits homosexuality and so claims based on 
sexual orientation must always be subordinated 
to other claims”—con)icts with the constitu-
tional requirement of neutrality because it fa-
vours one religious doctrine over other possible 
interpretations of the Bible and over religious 
teachings from other faiths. Or, to state it dif-
ferently, the judge could be seen as acting for a 
religious purpose; that is, deciding in a particu-
lar way so as to implement a particular religious 
rule.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that, within cer-
tain parameters, it is acceptable for a judge in a 
secular liberal democracy to include religious-
based reasoning in a judgment. Perhaps a pri-
or question is whether it is even possible for a 
religious person to set aside his or her beliefs 
when making certain sorts of decisions. We 
are of the view that, on issues of any signi%-
cance, no one can “bracket” their most funda-
mental beliefs (whether those are of a religious 
nature or based on a secular set of core values) 
when having to choose between two or more 
available outcomes.42 $is would suggest that 
where the law is underdetermined, religious 
judges will inevitably be in)uenced by their 
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religious beliefs, just as liberal judges will be 
in)uenced by their liberalism, humanist judg-
es in)uenced by their humanist philosophy, 
and so on. Some authors, such as Mark Mo-
dak-Truran, acknowledge “the necessary reli-
ance on religious convictions” where the law 
is underdetermined,43 but argue that this reli-
ance should not be made explicit. We would 
argue in favour of transparency.
While religious-based reasoning is not in-
herently dangerous or problematic, the use of 
such reasoning by judges does raise questions 
about the role of judges, fairness, and constitu-
tionality, which must be taken seriously.
 We conclude that reference to comprehen-
sive values, including religious values, would 
not undermine the proper role of the judiciary, 
so long as this reference is limited to situations 
where the law truly is underdetermined, and so 
long as there is actual reasoning, not simply a 
jump from a religious premise to a conclusion. 
In our view, if these conditions are met, there 
is nothing in religious-based judicial reasoning 
that inherently con)icts with the requirement 
that judges be principled, independent and im-
partial and have a strong respect for the rule of 
law. 
So long as the same limits are observed, 
such reasoning is not, in our view, unfair. We 
reject the notion that there exists some form 
of “public reason” that would be acceptable to 
all reasonable individuals. $us we consider it 
unrealistic to suggest that fairness requires ju-
dicial decisions to be grounded in reasons that 
would be considered satisfactory by all, includ-
ing the losing litigants. Where the underde-
termined nature of the legal issue at stake re-
quires judges to turn to extra-judicial values as 
a starting place for their analysis, it is no more 
unfair to the litigant who does not share the 
judge’s worldview if that analytic framework is 
based on religious grounds than if it is based on 
a secular philosophy such as libertarianism or 
communitarianism. 
We also conclude that section 2(a) of the Char-
ter is not automatically violated by religious-based 
judicial reasoning, assuming the parameters set 
out above are observed: the judge may only turn 
to extra-judicial comprehensive values when 
the law is underdetermined, and must engage 
in actual analysis and reasoning. $e losing 
litigant’s rights “to manifest religious belief by 
worship and practice or by teaching and dis-
semination,”44 and “not to be compelled to be-
long to a particular religion or to act in a man-
ner contrary to one’s religious beliefs,”45 would 
not be eroded simply because the judge rea-
soned from a faith-based worldview. Nor does 
using such a worldview as the starting place for 
judicial analysis necessarily depart from the re-
quirement of state neutrality regarding religion 
and thus result in unconstitutional coercion. 
We do recognize, however, that certain kinds 
of religious reasoning could indeed fall short of 
the constitutional requirement that the state re-
main neutral among di#erent religions and be-
tween religion and non-religion. If a judge used 
her religious convictions to always side with re-
ligious litigants over non-religious litigants, or 
to side with litigants of a particular faith, this 
would violate section 2(a) of the Charter (as well 
as violating more generally the judge’s duty of 
impartiality, not to mention failing to live up 
to the expectation that judicial reasoning in-
volves actual reasoning). Further, a judge who 
decided in a certain way so as to uphold a par-
ticular tenet of his faith would violate litigants’ 
freedom of religion. If judges are alert to these 
potential pitfalls, however, we would argue that 
there is no constitutional breach if a judge relies 
on religious-based reasoning when faced with 
a novel question of law to which constitution-
al principles, legislation and relevant case law 
provide no answer. In such a situation, a judge 
must inevitably turn to some set of comprehen-
sive values as a starting place for his analysis of 
competing public policy arguments and, if the 
restrictions set out above are adhered to, it is 
no more inherently dangerous or problematic 
if those values arise from religious rather than 
secular convictions.
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